CHAPTER 20
About reason, how it contemplates itself
Every art and faculty contemplates certain things especially. When
then it is itself of the same kind with the objects which it
contemplates, it must of necessity contemplate itself also: but when
it is of an unlike kind, it cannot contemplate itself. For instance,
the shoemaker's art is employed on skins, but itself is entirely
distinct from the material of skins: for this reason it does not
contemplate itself. Again, the grammarian's art is employed about
articulate speech; is then the art also articulate speech? By no
means. For this reason it is not able to contemplate itself. Now
reason, for what purpose has it been given by nature? For the right
use of appearances. What is it then itself? A system of certain
appearances. So by its nature it has the faculty of contemplating
itself so. Again, sound sense, for the contemplation of what things
does it belong to us? Good and evil, and things which are neither.
What is it then itself? Good. And want of sense, what is it? Evil.
Do you see then that good sense necessarily contemplates both itself
and the opposite? For this reason it is the chief and the first work
of a philosopher to examine appearances, and to distinguish them,
and to admit none without examination. You see even in the matter of
coin, in which our interest appears to be somewhat concerned, how we
have invented an art, and how many means the assayer uses to try the
value of coin, the sight, the touch, the smell, and lastly the
hearing. He throws the coin down, and observes the sound, and he is
not content with its sounding once, but through his great attention he
becomes a musician. In like manner, where we think that to be mistaken
and not to be mistaken make a great difference, there we apply great
attention to discovering the things which can deceive. But in the
matter of our miserable ruling faculty, yawning and sleeping, we
carelessly admit every appearance, for the harm is not noticed.
When then you would know how careless you are with respect to good
and evil, and how active with respect to things which are indifferent,
observe how you feel with respect to being deprived of the sight of
eyes, and how with respect of being deceived, and you will discover
you are far from feeling as you ought to in relation to good and evil.
"But this is a matter which requires much preparation, and much
labor and study." Well then do you expect to acquire the greatest of
arts with small labor? And yet the chief doctrine of philosophers is
brief. If you would know, read Zeno's writings and you will see. For
how few words it requires to say man's end is to follow the god's, and
that the nature of good is a proper use of appearances. But if you say
"What is 'God,' what is 'appearance,' and what is 'particular' and
what is 'universal nature'? then indeed many words are necessary. If
then Epicures should come and say that the good must be in the body;
in this case also many words become necessary, and we must be taught
what is the leading principle in us, and the fundamental and the
substantial; and as it is not probable that the good of a snail is
in the shell, is it probable that the good of a man is in the body?
But you yourself, Epicurus, possess something better than this. What
is that in you which deliberates, what is that which examines
everything, what is that which forms a judgement about the body
itself, that it is the principle part? and why do you light your
lamp and labor for us, and write so many books? is it that we may
not be ignorant of the truth, who we are, and what we are with respect
to you? Thus the discussion requires many words.
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